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ABSTRACT 
  
A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate the bidder’s expected profit and 
auctioner’s expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value (GIV) and 
Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed bid auction (where the mth bidder wins 
at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function.  The Common Value (CV) 
assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions 
(FPA) and Second Price Auctions (SPA) are included as special cases.  The optimal n 
bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models 
in equilibrium.  Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and 
prospects for further research. 
 
Key words: Auction Theory, General Independent Value Model, Mark up Pricing, kmth Price, 
Independent Private Values, Common Values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While the practice of auctioning goes back to ancient times1, the earliest academic treatments 
are relatively recent, with the contributions of Friedman (1956) from an operations research 
(decision theoretic) perspective, Vickery (1961) from a game theoretic perspective and Gates 
(1967) from what has been termed the tendering theory perspective (Runeson and Skitmore 
1999).  All three approaches have some impractical assumptions.  Decision theory (DT), for 
example, is essentially static, in that it assumes any given bidder’s opponents to bid with 
either a random or constant mark-up.  Game theory on the other hand assumes all bidders 
somehow always bid optimally as some, usually unstated, function of their item cost/value 
estimates. 
 Of the three, progress has been dominated by the development of the game theoretic 
approach into a full-blown Bayesian-Nash equilibrium theory, now termed Auction Theory 
(AT), under the standard economic assumption of rational utility maximisation – so that now 
“the auction problem can be understood by applying the usual logic of marginal revenue 
versus marginal cost” (Klemperer, 1999: 312)2. 
 One of the major outcomes of this theoretical development has been to discover the 
equilibrium bidding strategies for independent private value (IPV) auctions.  This assumes an 
idealised form of valuation process in which bidders privately know their own value3 of the 
                                                 
1 Cassady (1967) mentions a report by the Greek historian Herodotus, who described the sale by auction of 
women to be wives in Babylonia around the fifth century BC. 
2 The most notable contributions have come from Griesmer et al (1967), Wilson (1969, 1977), Milgrom (1979, 
1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) – see Klemperer (1999) 
for a comprehensive account. 
3 The term value is commonly used for highbid auctions.  For lowbid auctions, such as occurs in tendering for 
construction work, the equivalent term is cost (Flanagan and Norman 1985).  For highbid auctions, the bid 
denotes the amount of money paid by the bidder to the auctioner and vice versa for lowbid auctions.  The 
amount of money changing hands is determined by the auction payment rule.  For example, the first price 
auction (FPA) payment rule is that the amount of money changing hands is the amount of the winning bid – the 
highest bid in the case of highbid auction and the lowest (nth highest) bid in the case of lowbid auctions.  For 
the second price auction (SPA), on the other hand, the auction payment rule is that the amount of money 
changing hands is the amount of second highest bid in highbid auctions and second lowest (n-1th highest) in 
lowbid auctions.  Therefore, the bidder’s profit is obtained by subtracting the payment from the bidder’s value in 
highbid auctions and by subtracting the bidder’s cost from the payment in lowbid auctions.  As both highbid and 
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auctioned item perfectly accurately (but not the specific item values of opponents).  For 
example, Vickrey (1961) showed that if bidders are symmetric (that is, their item values are 
drawn from the same probability distribution, the parameters of which are known to all 
bidders), the expected revenue to the auctioner in English first-price (open-cry), sealed-bid, 
second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) and Dutch (descending) auctions is the same in 
equilibrium. 
 As an alternative to IPV auctions, in which each bidder is assumed to have different 
(perfectly estimated) item values, the common value (CV) model has been studied, in which 
the item value is assumed to be the same for all bidders, but imperfectly and privately 
estimated by each bidder (e.g., Wilson 1969)4.  Clearly, the private and common value 
assumptions are special cases of a more general model in which bidders have both different 
item values and imperfect estimates of them.  One version of this that has received 
considerable attention (e.g., Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982) assumes that each bidder receives a private value estimate, but allows each 
bidder’s item value to be a function of all the value estimates. With a suitable definition of 
this function in terms of the assumed conditional probabilities involved, Milgrom and Weber 
(1982) were able to develop the general model needed, termed the affiliated values model, by 
using a natural generalisation of the monotone likelihood ratio property commonly used in 
statistical models.  This provides several equilibrium results, the most important of which is 
that the English auction generates the highest prices followed by the second-price and, 
finally, the Dutch and first-price auction. 
 Milgrom and Weber’s work, however, is concerned with the general properties of 
symmetric auction models when value estimates are not independently distributed (Monteiro 
                                                                                                                                                        
lowbid auctions are dealt with simultaneously in this paper, the term ‘item value’ is used throughout to denote 
value/cost and the term ‘payment’ to denote the amount of money changing hands. 
4 The (perfectly) estimated value for IPV auctions is termed the ‘type’ while the (imperfectly) estimated value 
for CV auctions is termed the ‘signal’.  Here we use the term ‘value estimate’ throughout. 
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and Moreira 2006:1), making the affiliation assumption, as Milgrom and Weber point out, 
necessarily restrictive.  Although, as they say, it may accord well with the qualitative features 
of some situations, such as the sale of works of art, there are many other situations where it 
does not (Monteiro and Moreira 2006:1; de Castro 2004). In fact, de Castro (2004) is 
particularly critical, observing that the affiliated values assumption is “very restrictive”; much 
more cumbersome to manipulate theoretically, with the monoticity of equilibrium hard to 
maintain; and leading to conclusions that are misleading if we try to apply them to reality.  In 
his view, a return to the search for non-monotonic equilibria is urgently needed, citing 
Araujo, de Castro and Moriera’s (2003) general existence result of non-monotonic symmetric 
equilibria with independent types.  Araujo, de Castro and Moreira (2004), among others, have 
continued this work to examine multidimensional situations.  Meanwhile Lebrun (1996, 
1999) has obtained some results for asymmetric first price auctions, that is when bidders’ 
item values are differently distributed, while Cantillon (2004) has considered both first and 
second price asymmetries.  Guth et al (2005) provide a summary of much of the asymmetry 
work.  No treatment appears yet to have been made of the equilibria for an asymmetric 
general independent values model where bidders have both different item values and 
imperfect associated estimates – most likely because of the difficulties involved in finding 
analytical solutions (Rothkopf et al 2003: 72). 
 Unlike AT, the goal of the DT approach is to maximise profits by the more practical 
means of mark-up manipulation in what is often termed "cost-plus pricing"5.  This involves 
finding equilibria in DT-like scalar strategies rather than AT functions (Rothkopf et al 
2003:73).  Equilibrium multiplicative mark-up strategies in a symmetric CV sealed bid game 
theoretic setting have been reported in several studies.  Rothkopf (1969, 1980a), for example, 
                                                 
5 Hanson (1992), for example, mentions that "researchers report a sizable number of companies that use cost-
plus pricing". There is also a considerable literature recording and advocating the use of a cost plus a percentage 
or dollar markup or combination of the two in practice.  Eichner (1973), for example refers to "the 
overwhelming empirical evidence that most large business firms set their prices 
on the basis of a certain percentage mark-up above costs". 
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solves the n bidder Weibull distributed first price auction (FPA) situation analytically, while 
Oren and Rothkopf (1975), extend this to the situation where a bidder’s strategy in one 
auction affects his competitors’ behaviour in subsequent auctions, modelling bidding in a 
sequence of auctions as a multistage control process.  Smith and Case (1975), on the other 
hand, consider the two bidder loglogistic CV FPA situation for both pure and mixed 
(randomised) strategies, while Rothkopf (1991) also considers the n bidder CV Weibull FPA 
and second price auction (SPA) situations in which bidders may submit two or more bids and 
then withdraw some bids after bids are opened. 
 No equilibrium results have been reported for scalar strategies other than multiplicative, 
with the exception of Rothkopf (1980b), who found, analytically, the equilibrium linear 
(affine) FPA mark-ups in the Weibull CV n bidder situation.  In general, however, it is 
concluded that, despite the difficulties involved in equilibrium modelling with value 
uncertainties, multiplicative mark-up models at least have had some success.  In this paper, 
we follow Rothkopf (1980b) in considering both the equilibrium multiplicative and additive 
mark-ups within a general linear mark-up strategy. 
 To do this, the starting point was to return to the DT original theme and consider the 
model where bidders have, independently, both different item values and their imperfect 
estimates.   This is developed in this paper in the form of a generalised bidding model for 
highbid and lowbid auctions to include the major AT equilibrium models and DT models of 
bidding.  From an AT perspective, this involves three major departures from the standard 
underlying assumptions: 
(1) Restriction of the bidding function to a linear (affine) mark-up.  DT assumes (in line with 
bidding practice) that bids are generated by applying a mark-up, in the form of an 
addition and/or multiplication, to the estimated item value.  Standard AT, however, rarely 
makes such specific assumptions.  A formless bid function is normally assumed, with an 
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explicit mark-up function seldom being prescribed.  This suggests some modification is 
needed to standard AT to better reflect common practice.  As Satterthwaite et al (2012) 
put it - "A procedure that endures in practice and seems to perform well but not 
[necessarily] optimally in a theoretical sense compels a reappraisal of the optimization 
analysis". Recent AT work by Compte and Postlewaite has pursued this theme.  For 
example, they examine the effects of "strategy restrictions", where bidders are less 
concerned with maximising than following a set of rules they have learned or been taught 
the circumstances under which each of the rules is optimal (Compte and Postlewaite 
2012).  With the exceptions noted above by Rothkopf and others, however, equilibrium 
mark-up solutions are not yet known6.   
(2) Fixed difference independent values. The general DT literature, starting with Friedman 
(1956), assumes the difference between the expected value of each bidder’s true costs 
(item values) to be fixed and non-zero – in contrast with IPV (where differences are 
assumed to be random) and CV (where differences are assumed to be zero) 
(3) The kmth price award.  A common assumption is an auction mechanism where the best 
ranked bid wins the item. However, Myerson (1981), for example, has shown the 
limitations of the using this as an allocation rule. Several alternatives have been reported 
in practice too, including "eliminating the highest bidder and awarding the contract with a 
'second-highest-bid-wins' rule" (Switzerland)), eliminating the two highest bids (Italy) 
and the use of median bid auctions (Taiwan) (Decarolis 2009).  Hoppe & Moldovanu 
(2009) have investigated this analytically in terms of mth highest and median-bid-wins 
auctions in a general function IPV setting.  kth price auctions, on the other hand, where 
the payment for the winning bid is the value of the kth ranked bid, have also received 
analytical treatment (e.g. Wolfstetter, 1996, 2001).   Taken together, these suggest the 
                                                 
6 Also worthy of note is that a linear strategy is often the best response to a linear strategy even under full 
rationality (e.g. Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983). 
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need for a more general kmth price auction, where the item is obtained by the mth ranked 
bidder at the amount of the kth ranked bid. 
 
From a DT perspective, the most important additional consideration is the need to provide for 
the dynamics of the game playing situation – that each bidder needs to allow for the potential 
actions of opponents, who also allow for the potential actions of the bidder, etc ad infinitum. 
 This paper is organised as follows.  First a generalised bidding model is developed to 
calculate the bidder’s expected profit and auctioner’s expected revenue/payment for both 
Independent Private Value (IPV)  and General Independent Value (GIV) kmth price sealed bid 
auctions (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear mark-up function.  
The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric 
First Price Auctions (FPA) and Second Price Auctions (SPA) are included as special cases.  
The n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the highbid and lowbid 
uniform FPA IPV and GIV models in equilibrium.  Final comments concern implications, the 
assumptions involved and prospects for further research. 
 
 
MODEL 
 
Define a kmth price auction as a sealed bid where the mth ranked bidder wins the item and the 
payment is the kth ranked bid.  For the highbid auction, therefore, the mth highest bidder wins 
the item and the payment is the kth highest bid while, for the lowbid auction, the mth lowest 
bidder wins the item and the payment is the kth lowest bid.  Let bidders be indexed ni ,,1   
 2n and bids iiii vSvB 21   where iS is an independent random variable denoting the 
unbiased estimated item value and iv1 and iv2  are (affine) mark-up manipulators. The 
expected payment is 
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 (1)
 
 
and expected profit for bidder i  
 
          mimikiimk bbbbtcE  Pr,    (2) 
 
where 
 
 ic  is the bidder’s actual item value 
  kt is the payment contingent on winning 
  mi bb  indicates that bidder i has the mth bid and wins the auction 
 1 indicates a highbid auction and 1 indicates a lowbid auction 
 
If ib is a value from a unique density function,  xf i , then 
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   2/11   nkk  and    2/11   nmm  
     xFx   21  
     xFx   21  
    2/2/  xx   
    2/2/  xx   
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and 
 
1  if km    
1  if mk   
1  if       2/112/11   nknm  
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with the distribution function     
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Substituting into (2) then gives 
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where  ii SEc   (e.g. Rothkopf 1969: 364) for the GIV assumption and 
i
i
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2
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IPV assumption.  The expected payment is 
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Note that for the symmetrical case, (8) and (9) simplify to 
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Two special cases 
 
For the FPA ( 1 mk ), for example, (10) and (11) become 
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while the SPA ( 1,2  mk ) is 
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Optimal mark-ups 
 
 
It is assumed that all the bidders know: the value of n, k, m,  ,  iSE  and the distribution 
form and parameters of  xf i   ni ,,2,1  .  It is also assumed that each bidder knows his 
own estimated item value, is , - no one else does - and no one would ever revise his or her 
valuation when those of opponents are disclosed (Wolfsetter 1996:371).  When k=m, for 
example, the optimal mark-ups for iv1  and iv 2 , are obtained by finding the values that 
maximise (10) for a bidder.  This can be done numerically for each bidder by maximising 
(10) after assuming some appropriate composite density form and suitable starting values, or 
analytically, by differentiating (10) with respect to iv1  and iv 2 , setting to zero and solving for 
iv1  and iv 2 .   The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium mark-ups can be attempted numerically in the 
same way but repeating the procedure in turn for each bidder until and if convergence occurs.  
To do this analytically, involves differentiating (10), setting to zero and solving for iv1  and 
iv 2 simultaneously for all bidders.  The next section provides the equilibrium results for the 
symmetric uniform distribution. 
 
 
THE SYMMETRIC UNIFORM EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Linear mark up pricing 
 
Assume bids are symmetrically and uniformly distributed with mean  and variance  
and supports 3 a and 3 b .  Then, from (10-12), for the IPV situation 
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   121 vvn
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
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The symmetrical version of the GIV situation is the CV model, where 
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Table 17 provides the derivatives of (10-11) with respect to iv1  and iv 2  and, setting 
ji vvv 111  and ji vvv 222  , together with the equilibrium results for *1v and *2v .  As is 
indicated, no equilibrium solutions exist for the CV case. 
 Table 2 summarises the results for all combinations of n, m and k values for the IPV 
situation in terms of the distribution moments.  Equilibrium exists only for 1m and nm   
with the results being mirrored, the  * 1mR and  * nmR   trending towards opposite supports 
while  * 1mE  and  * nmE  trend towards zero from positive and negative values respectively.  
Therefore the 1m mechanism, somewhat surprisingly, provides the best result for both the 
auctioner and the bidders irrespective of the value of k. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note the definition 100  is used throughout this paper. 
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Additive mark-up pricing 
 
Here, the model is 
 
 iii svt   (23) 
 
Setting 12 iv , for the IPV situation 
 
  
 
 
 
  





11
1 1
, nn
abk
n
vb
nn
mabmnE mk   (24) 
 
21
12
21
ab
n
knbavRk

  (25) 
 
and, for the CV situation 
 
     

 

n
vab
nn
knE mk 1, 21
12  (26) 
 
21
12
21
ab
n
knbavRk

  (27) 
 
Table 3 provides the derivatives with respect to iv1  together with the equilibrium results.  
Table 4 summarises the results for all combinations of n, m and k values in terms of the 
distribution moments.  In this case, equilibrium exists for 1m and nm   for both the IPV 
and CV situations.  For the IPV,  * 1mR and  * nmR   trend towards opposite supports while 
15 
 
 * 1mE  and  * nmE   trend towards zero from positive and negative values respectively.  
Therefore the 1m mechanism again provides the best result for both the auctioner and the 
bidders in the IPV situation.  The trends are reversed for the CV the situation, with the nm 
mechanism providing the best result for the auctioner, but with the 1m mechanism still 
being the best for the bidder. 
 In contrast with linear mark-up pricing, the value of k has an influencing effect in this 
case, with  * 1mR  being maximised at nk   but with an associated minimisation of  * 1mE  for 
the IPV situation.  Similarly, for the CV situation, with  * nmR   is maximised at kmn   but 
with an associated minimisation of  * nmE  . 
 
 
Multiplicative mark-up pricing 
 
This time, the model is 
 
 iii svt   (28) 
 
Setting 01 iv , for the IPV situation 
 
  
 
  

 

21
1212
2
1
2
22
,
ab
nn
mnvnkvbaE mk   (29) 
 221
12
2
vab
n
knbaRk 

 
  (30) 
 
and, for the CV situation 
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  
 
  

 

21
12
2
1
2
22
,
ab
nn
vnkvbaE mk   (31) 
 221
12
2
vab
n
knbaRk 

 
  (32) 
 
Table 5 provides the derivatives with respect to iv 2  together with the equilibrium results.  
Unlike the linear and additive pricing mechanisms, however, there are no simple results in 
terms of distribution moments for multiplicative mark ups due to the additive form of the 
expected profit and payment adopted in (2).  To continue this general approach, a 
multiplicative version of (2) is needed such as 
 
      
  mi
mik
i
imk bbbbt
c
E 



 Pr,    (33) 
 
An alternative used by Maskin & Riley (2000b), for instance, is to consider the special case 
where one of the distribution supports is zero.  That is, either a=0 or b=0.  Setting a=0 
provides the results, for the IPV situation 
 
  
  

 
 22, 1
1212
1
2
v
n
mnvkn
n
bE mk   (31) 
 




1
121
2
2
n
knbvRk  (32) 
 
and, for the CV situation 
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  
  

 
 22. 1
12
1
2
v
n
vkn
n
bE k   (31) 
 




1
121
2
2
n
knbvRk  (32) 
 
Table 7 summarises the results for all combinations of n, m and k values in terms of the 
distribution moments for high bid and low bid auctions.  In this case, equilibrium exists for 
all mechanisms, both in the IPV and CV situations.  For the IPV,  * 1mR and  * nmR   trend 
towards opposite supports while  * 1mE   and  * nmE  trend identically towards zero from 
negative values for both high and low bid auctions.  However the IPV  * 1mnR and  * 1mnE  
both differ for the  high and low bid auctions, but providing the best   * 1mnR  and  * 1mnE
providing the best result for the auctioner and bidder in both cases for m=n-1.  For the CV 
situation,  * 1mnR  and  * 1mnE provide the best result for the auctioner and bidder ( 0* E ) 
together with  * nmR  ,  * nmE  ,  * 1mR  and  * 1mE  for high and low bid auctions respectively. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Correspondence with previous work 
 
Surprisingly, despite an overwhelming amount of previous work in AT, very few absolute 
quantitative results have been reported.  One exception is Klemperer’s general bidding 
function in the FPA highbid ( 1 ) situation, where the equilibrium bid corresponds with 
Table 2 as  as
n
nas
n
n
n
a  11  (where 3 a ) (Klemperer 1999: 57).  
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Another is Maskin and Riley (2000a), whose numerical analysis gives 33.0*1 R  for the 
uniform symmetrical IPV 2 bidder highbid auction with 5.0 , 
32
1 , which again 
corresponds with Table 2.  Skitmore (2008) has also provided some numerical results for 
FPA and SPA special cases for the uniform and normal symmetrical and asymmetrical 
densities.  For example, the equilibrium additive mark=up for the symmetrical lowbid 
uniform IPV FPA is given as 3*1 v ,  1
32*
 nnE
  and *R = *
1
E
n
n
 , again 
corresponding with Table 4. 
 
 
Best mechanism 
 
As Tables 2, 4 and 6 show, the values of *R  and *E are determined solely by   and   in the 
expressions 
 
3*  kR  
 
and  
 
  3* , mkE  
 
This enables the best mechanisms to be identified independently of   and   as the 
mechanism with the highest ranking   value identifies the best *R and hence the best 
mechanism for rational auctioners.  The mechanism with the highest ranking   value on the 
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other hand, identifies the best *E and hence the best mechanism for rational bidders.    Table 
7 summarises these best mechanisms for both *R and *E for the three mark-up pricing 
methods in highbid and lowbid auctions in IPV and CV situations.  Of note here is that *E is 
positive for all the *R best mechanisms identified except for n=2.  Also, the best mechanism 
is independent of n for n>3. 
 
 
Mark-up hopping 
 
In attempting to apply these results in practice it is obvious that, although the auctioner 
invariably chooses the auction mechanism, only the bidders can choose the pricing method to 
use.  Therefore, although the auctioner may choose the best mechanism from Table 7 on the 
assumption, say, that the bidders will use linear mark-up pricing, the bidders may instead opt 
to use a different pricing method in order to increase their *E values.  As a result, the 
auctioner now becomes a player.  For example, for the IPV high bid n=4 auction, the 
auctioner’s best mechanism is k=4, m=1, for which   is maximum in equilibrium at 0.4 
when bidders are additive mark-up pricing.  However, for the bidders, the n=k=4, m=1 
mechanism produces a   of only 0.05 when additive mark-up pricing, in comparison with 
1 when multiplicative or linear mark-up pricing.  If, in the knowledge of this, the bidders 
then switch to one of the other two pricing methods, the auctioner’s then drops to 0.20.  To 
counter this, the auctioner may then consider the second best n=4   value, which is 30.0
at n=4, k=3, m=1, again assuming additive mark-up pricing.  Yet again though, it profits the 
bidders more to use multiplicative or linear pricing as both these again improve   from 0.05 
to 1 and leaves the auctioner again with 20.0 .  So finally the auctioner realises there are 
now no further options available that will yield 20.0 and examines all the mechanisms 
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that will produce 20.0 .  These comprise all the m=1 mechanisms.  However, for n=4, 
k=m=1, the bidders maximise their expected profit to 25.1  additive mark-up pricing, the 
effect of which is to reduce the auctioner’s even further to 0.10.  The auctioner’s best 
mechanism in this case is therefore 14  mkn , which produces 20.0 .  Extending 
this argument to all other situations provides the general solution for the best mechanism for 
uniform IPV auctions of 1 mkn  for n>2.  For n=2, a similar line of reasoning indicates 
the best mechanism to be 2m , with 1k . 
 
 
“Truth telling strategies” 
 
Of particular interest here is the extent to which Vickrey’s “truth-telling” effect still prevails 
in the mark-up model presented in this paper.  That is where 0*1 v and 1*2 v .  Inspection of 
Table 2 indicates this to indeed be the case for the IPV m=1, k=2 (SPA) mechanism for 
linear mark-up pricing, with the same result also occurring asymptotically as n becomes 
large.  The same result also occurs for the IPV additive mark-up (Table 4) but with the m=1, 
k=1 (FPA) mechanism applying for the CV situation, while for the multiplicative mark-up, 
the SPA mechanism again prevails in both IPV highbid and lowbid situations, but not in 
either of the CV highbid or lowbid situations. 
 
 
Behaviour of *R and *E  
 
Some further comments concerning *R and *E are also worthy of mention.  Firstly, in 
addition to the finding that the relative *R and *E values are independent of   and  that is, 
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they can be expressed in terms of 3*  kR and   3* , mkE  (under the assumption 
that either 03   for multiplicative mark-ups): 
 *R generally tends asymptotically to the distribution support as n increases.  One 
exception of this occurs with the CV additive mark-up result, where   1
2
1,1  n
n  
(Table 7) 
 Increases in *R are commensurate with decreases in *E  (Table 7) 
 Although the values of *1v  differ for highbid and lowbid IPV multiplicative mark-ups, 
the *R and associated *E results are identical for the m=n and m=1 mechanisms, 
although this is not the case for the CV situation (Table 6). 
 
 
Effect of increased variability/uncertainty 
 
In contrast with previous findings (e.g., Flanagan and Norman, 1985), the results here clearly 
indicate that both *R and *E increase as   increases – suggesting, counter intuitively, that 
both auctioner and bidders benefit from increased variability/uncertainty.  This raises the 
possibility of auctioners and bidders not only exploiting auctions where the item value is less 
certain, but even deliberately distorting the amount of uncertainly involved.  However, as 
noted below, this finding may be more a result of the assumptions made in the model than of 
any practical significance. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has presented a combined Independent Private Value (IPV) and General 
Independent Valuec (GIV) equilibrium linear mark-up model for kmth price sealed bid 
auctions that encompasses the Common Values (CV) assumption, symmetric and asymmetric 
highbid and lowbid first and second price auctions, and additive and multiplicative mark-ups 
all as special cases.  Analytical results for the equilibrium mark-up, expected profit and 
expected revenue/payment are provided for the uniform density for the n bidder symmetric 
IPV and GIV models. Work on the asymmetric situation will be reported in a later paper. 
 Although this work provides an advancement of AT towards the more practical situation 
existing in many applications, where a strategic mark-up is applied to an estimated value, it 
should be said that there is much to do yet before practical implementation8.   Of particular 
concern is the amount of information assumed to be known.  This includes the type and 
parameters of the probability distributions involved and their associated bidders for each 
auction.  If these are to be estimated from past auction bids, what method of estimation is to 
be used?  This raises the related and deeper question concerning the stability of the 
parameters involved.  Bidders are known to change their behaviour over time, in responses to 
changes in economic, legal and social circumstances; changes in personnel, risk attitudes, 
goals and strategic approaches such as loss leaders aimed at increasing longer term market 
share, bidder interdependence, etc and yet models do not take such changes into account, or 
even distinguish between long and short term effects in general.  Neither do models take into 
account the dynamics involved as the effects of bidding in one auction are fed into the 
decision making for the next auction.  Likewise, current models do not take into account the 
costs of bidding and their compensation, opportunity costs, the effect of taking bribes, 
coalitions, etc.  
                                                 
8 See Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) for a general survey. 
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 A further major issue, identified by Thaler (1988), is what to do when some bidders do 
not behave in an optimal way.  Will a bounded rationality approach be possible?  What kind 
of treatment is needed for non-optimising liars and cheats or those who artificially manipulate 
bids to fool competitors into making incorrect assumptions?   In the words of Rothkopf 
(1969: 370), “a spiteful or ignorant competitor can make [equilibrium mark-up strategies] 
useless”.  Finally, in view of what has been said above, to what extent is the equilibrium 
assumption itself justified?  Given the dynamics involved, it may be more realistic to 
consider models aimed more at survival than profit maximisation. 
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mk   
IPV 



 
i
i
i v
vxc
2
1
    2
1
2
12 1011
nvvab
vvb
n
k m 



 
 
 
 
       
  2
2121
2
12
1
221
0
11
vnn
mkvabvvbn
vab
vvb
n
kb m 




 
 
1
1
2 
 miff
kn
ka
  
1
1
1 
 miff
kn
n
 
CV
 

 
2
baci
       12
21 0
2
122 





 m
vabn
banvabnnv
n
k      
 
    
  2
2121
2
12
12
2221
0
2
212
vnn
vabkvbabvn
vabn
nvvabknbban
b m 

 
 No equilibrium exists (no turning point for any v1 value) Indeterminate (depends on v1) 
Table 1: Derivatives with respect to 1v and 2v  and linear mark-up equilibria
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Type *1v  
*
2v  *E  *R  
1m   312    kn k  1
1


kn
n
  31
2 nn  31
3  

n
n
nm    311    kn  k
n 1
  31
2  nn  31
3  

n
n
1 mn  Indeterminate/no 
equilibrium 
Indeterminate/no 
equilibrium 
NA NA 
Table 2: IPV linear mark up results in terms of moments 
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Type Model Derivative wrt iv1 proportional to  *1v  
mk 
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  n
v
ab
mmn 100
1
1

   100   mmnn ab  
CV.


 
2
baci
 111 0
2
10
2
1  

 

 
mmn
ab
v
ab
v
 
  
1
1
00
00
2
1



 mmn
mmnab
 
km 
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  nab
v
n
k mn 101 1 



   
n
abkn
n
ab
mn
0  
CV.


 
2
baci
 mn
ab
v
n
k 


 02
1 1   mniffab
n
kn 
2
2
 
mk 
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  nab
v
n
k m 101 11 



  

  10
11 mkn
ab
 
CV.


 
2
baci
 11 0
2
2 



 m
ab
v
n
n
n
k
11
2


  miffnk
n
ab
 
 
Table 3: Derivatives with respect to 1v  and additive mark-up equilibria 
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Type Model *1v  *E  *R  
1m  
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  
  322 
n
k
 
 
  31
22
2 

nn
kn
 
3
)1(
4232  





nn
knn
 
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 3
22 
n
kn    31
12
2 

nn
kn   3
)1(
12  





nn
kn
nm 
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  
  312 
n
kn
 
 
  31
12
2


nn
kn
 
3
)1(
222  





nn
knn
 
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 3
2 
n
kn
   31
2
2  nn
k
   31
2  



 nn
k
 
mn
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  No turning point NA NA 
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 No turning point
 
NA
 
NA 
Table 4: Additive mark-up results in terms of moments
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Type Model Derivative wrt iv2 proportional to  *2v  
mk   
IPV 



 
i
i v
xc
2
         2 22 2
122
1
2100
vnn
vnbbmbma
vab
vba mmn


       
     nbbmbmaabbann nbbmbmaabbann mmn
mmn




122
122
001
2001
CV 


 
2
baci
        2
2
2
1
22
2
2
12
0202
nv
babv
nn
abm
vab
babvbbaava mmn 

         
     nbbmbmaabbann abbanbnbana mmn
mmn

 

122
1
001
1010
2
1  
km   
IPV 



 
i
i v
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2
  
      
  2
22
2
2
1
221
0
vnn
abmkvvbn
vab
a
n
k
ab
ba mn 





 
           nbbkbkaabnbkbkaan
nbbmbmaabann
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mn




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201 2
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

 
2
baci
  
    
  2
22
2 12
2210
2 vnn
abkvbabvn
vab
ba
n
k
ab
ba mn 






 
         abbnbkbkabana banabanmn
mn

 

10
01
2
1
mk   
IPV 



 
i
i v
xc
2
   
      
  2
221
2
2
1
221011
vnn
abmkvvbn
vab
vb
n
kb m 




            nbbkbkaabbanbkbkabn
nbbmbmaabbnn
m
m




1
12
01
201
CV 


 
2
baci
  
    
  2
221
2
2
12
2210
2
21
vnn
abkvbabvn
vab
bvba
n
kb m 




           nbbkbkaabbanbkbkabn banbban m
m

 

1
1
01
01
2
1
Table 5: Derivatives with respect to iv 2  and multiplicative mark-up equilibria 
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Type Model *2v highbid 
*
2v lowbid 
*E  highbid 
*E  lowbid 
*R  highbid 
*R  lowbid 
1m
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  1
1


kn
n
 k
2
  31
2 nn   31
2 nn  31
3 

n
n 3
1
3 

n
n
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 
  
 12
11


knn
nn
 k
n
2
1 312 n 0
nm 
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  1
2
 kn  n
n 1   31
2  nn    31
2  nn  31
3 

n
n 3
1
3 

n
n
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 
1
1
2
1


kn
n
 
  
nk
nn
2
11 
0 312 n    3
1
n

 
1 mn
 
IPV 
 ii vxc 1  1
12 

kn
mn
 k
m2
 
  31
12 

nn
mn
 
  31
2 nn
m
 31
343  

n
mn
 
3
1
14  

n
mn
 
GIV 
(CV)


 
2
baci
 
 k
n
2
1
0 0  
Table 6: Multiplicative mark-up results in terms of moments
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1
1
2
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Table 7: Best mechanisms 
 
  (R)  (E) 
 n=2 n=3 n>3 n=2 n=3 n>3 
IPV 
Linear mark-
up 
k 1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  
m m=n 2m  m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 
equil 
3
1
 0 
1
3


n
n
 
3
1
 
6
1
  1
2
nn  
Additive 
mark-up 
k k=n k=n k=n k=1 k=1 k=1 
m m=n 2m  m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 
equil 
3
2
 
6
1
 
 
 1
41


nn
nn
 
2
1
 
9
2
 2
2
n
 
Multiplicative 
(highbid) 
k 1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  
m m=n m=2 m=2 m=1 m=1 m=1 
equil 
3
1
 1 
1
53


n
n
 
3
1
 
6
1
  1
2
nn  
Multiplicative 
(lowbid) 
k 1 kn  1 kn 1 kn 1 kn 1 kn  1 kn
m m=n 2m  m=1 m=1 m=(n-1) m=(n-1) 
equil 
3
1
 0 
1
3


n
n
 
3
1
 
3
1
  1
2
nn
m
 
CV 
Linear mark-
up 
k NA NA NA NA NA NA 
m NA NA NA NA NA NA 
equil NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Additive 
mark-up 
k k=n k=n k=n k=1 k=1 k=1 
m m=n m=n m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 
equil 
3
2
 
2
1
 
1
2
n
n
 
3
1
 
6
1
  1
2
nn  
Multiplicative 
(highbid) 
k 1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  
m m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 m=1 
equil 
2
1
 
3
1
 
n
1
 
4
1
 
9
1
 2
1
n
 
Multiplicative 
(lowbid) 
k 1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  1 kn  
m m=n m=n m=n m=1 nm   nm 
equil 
2
1
 
3
1
 
n
1
 0 0 0 
